Abstract. We survey a recent application of algebraic curves over finite fields to the constructions of authentication codes.
Introduction
Authentication codes were invented by Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane [5] . The general theory of unconditional authentication has been developed by Simmons ( [10, 11] ) and has been extensively studied in recent years.
In the conventional model for unconditional authentication, there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver and an opponent. The transmitter wants to communicate some information to the receiver using a public channel which is subject to active attack. That is, the opponent can either impersonate the transmitter and insert a message on the channel, or replace a transmitted message with another. To protect against these threats, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret key, the key is then used in an authentication code (A-code for short).
A systematic A-code (or A-code without secrecy) is a code where the source state (i.e. plain text) is concatenated with an authenticator (or a tag) to obtain a message which is sent through the channel. Such a code is a triple (S, E, T ) of finite sets together with a (authentication) mapping f : S × E → T . Here S is the set of source states, E is the set of keys and T is the set of authenticators. When the transmitter wants to send the information s ∈ S using a key e ∈ E, which is secretly shared with the receiver, he transmits the message m = (s, t), where s ∈ S and t = f (s, e) ∈ T . When the receiver receives a message m = (s, t), she checks the authenticity by verifying whether t = f (s, e) or not, using the secret key e ∈ E. If the equality holds, the message m is called valid.
Suppose the opponent has the ability to insert messages into the channel and/or to modify existing messages. When the opponent inserts a new message m = (s , t ) into the channel, this is called impersonation attack. When the opponent sees a message m = (s, t) and changes it to a message m = (s , t ) where s = s , this is called substitution attack.
We assume that there is a probability distribution on the source states, which is known to all the participants. Given the probability distribution on the source
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states, the receiver and the transmitter will choose a probability distribution for E. We will denote the probability of success for the opponent when trying impersonation attack and substitution attack, by P I and P S , respectively, and P (·) and P (·|·) specify probability and conditional probability distribution on the message space M := S × E. Then we have
and
If we further assume that the keys and the source states are uniformly distributed, then the deception probabilities can be expressed as
In the remainder of the paper, we will always assume that the keys and the source states are uniformly distributed.
We observe that each parameter of an A-code (S, E, T ) plays a role:
• the size of S indicates how large the plain text could be;
• the size of E is the number of keys, which represents the number of users;
• the size of T is the number of authenticators, which represents the transmission rate; • P I is the security measure against the impersonation attack;
• P S is the security measure against the substitution attack.
It is clear that for fixed sizes of S, E and T , we want P i and P S to be as small as possible. In other words, if P I , P S and |T | are fixed, we are interested in A-codes (S, E, T ) with |S| and |E| as large as possible. In particular, the study of the asymptotic behaviour of (log |S|)/|E| for fixed |T |, P I = 1/|T | and P S is one of the most important topics for A-codes. For a review of different bounds and constructions for A-codes, we refer to [7, 13, 8] .
In this survey paper, we present an explicit construction of A-codes based on algebraic curves over finite fields.
Constructions
In this section, we describe a construction of authentication codes based on algebraic curves over finite fields.
Before starting our construction, we need to introduce some concepts and notations that are essential for the construction. For further results on algebraic curves over finite fields, we refer to [12, 16] .
We fix some notations for this section.
: power of a prime; F : the finite field of elements; X : a projective, absolutely irreducible, complete algebraic curve defined over F . We simply say that X is an algebraic curve; g = g(X ): the genus of X ; F (X ): the function field of X ; X (F ): the set of all F -rational points on X .
A divisor G of X /F q is a formal sum
where S is a finite non-empty set of points of X , and
for all automorphisms σ ∈ Gal(F /F ), where F is a fixed algebraic closure of F and Gal(F /F ) is the Galois group of F /F . In this paper we always mean a rational divisor whenever a divisor is mentioned. We write ν P for the normalized discrete valuation corresponding to the point P of X .
For a divisor G we form the vector space
Then L(G) is a finite-dimensional vector space over F , and we denote its dimension by l(G). By the Riemann-Roch theorem (see [12, 16] ), we have
and equality holds if deg(G) ≥ 2g − 1. Now we are ready to describe the construction. Let P be a subset of X (F ), i.e., P is a set of F -rational points of X . Let D be a positive divisor with P ∩ Supp(D) = ∅. Choose an F -rational point R in P and put
and consider the map f
It can be proved that (S, E, T ) constructed above together with f forms an A-code with the deception probabilities 
Theorem 2.1 gives a construction of A-codes based on general algebraic curves over finite fields. In the examples below, we apply Theorem 2.1 to some special curves to obtain A-code with nice parameters. 
The A-code (S, E, T ) with the above parameters can also be found in [2] . It can be proved that the above A-code is optimal in the sense that 
These A-codes had not been known before the construction in Theorem 2.1 was introduced (see [19] ). 
The above example provides the first explicit construction of A-codes with lim |E|→0 (log |S|)/|E| > 0 for fixed |T |, P I = 1/|T | and P S .
